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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with the safeguards against excessive punitive damages 
and attorney’s fee awards in American trade secret law.  Because defendants 
frequently include former employees of the plaintiff, the effect of excessive 
liability upon the mobility of employees is a concern.1  Following an overview 
of American trade secret liability, including the widely-enacted Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act,2 the United States Supreme Court doctrine forbidding excessive 
punitive damages and other safeguards against imposition of excessive punitive 
damages and attorney’s fees are discussed. 
Future development of the Supreme Court doctrine and additional 
experience with the Uniform Act could require reassessment.  At the present 
time, however, the Act is calibrated to avoid constitutionally excessive punitive 
damage and attorney’s fee awards with one exception.  In cases with large 
compensatory damage recoveries and defendants without subjective evil intent, 
the Act’s two times compensatory damages cap upon punitive damages3 is too 
generous and is superseded by the Supreme Court’s Gore/Campbell 
guideposts.4 
II.  THE NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive or exemplary damages are imposed for the commission of serious 
misconduct with a bad state of mind.5  The Restatement of Torts (Second), for 
example, states “[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is 
outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference 
to the rights of others.”6  Punitive damages are intended to punish the defendant 
and to deter future misconduct by the defendant and others.7  The imposition of 
 
1.  Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of 
Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 664 (1996) (trade secret 
protection creates tension with the ability of ex-employees to change jobs). 
2.  See infra notes 28–35. 
3.  See infra note 36. 
4.  See infra notes 96–104. 
5.  3 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 35 (2d ed. 
West 2011). 
6.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).  
7.  Id. §908(1).  However, in Connecticut and Michigan common-law punitive damages are 
regarded as compensatory.  Connecticut views them as compensation for a successful plaintiff’s legal 
expenses and Michigan as compensation for a successful plaintiff’s intangible injuries.  See 1 JOHN J. 
KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICE §§ 4.2–4.4 (2013).   
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punitive damages is discretionary with the trier of fact.8  In most states,9 
punitive damages can be awarded in tort actions for intentional or reckless 
misconduct,10 including trade secret misappropriation.11 
The amount of punitive damages traditionally has been discretionary with 
the trier of fact, subject to review for excessiveness by the trial judge and on 
appeal.12  A trial judge can order a successful plaintiff to choose between 
remitting excessive punitive damages and a new trial,13 whereas an appellate 
court can reverse a judgment for excessive punitive damages14 and remand the 
case for further proceedings.15 
On the other hand, under the “American rule,”16 a successful plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees ordinarily are not recoverable compensatory damages.  Each 
litigant bears its own attorney’s fees under the American rule.17 A punitive 
 
8.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. d. (“Whether to award punitive damages 
and the determination of the amount are within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, whether judge 
or jury.”).  
9.  Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington do not allow 
recovery of punitive damages for common-law torts.  See 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 7, §§ 
4.6–4.10. 
10.  See 3 DOBBS et al., supra note 5, at 41–43 (punitive damages have been approved “in a 
wide variety of cases”). 
11.  E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 950, 958 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (award 
of $85 million in punitive damages for trade secret misappropriation).  
12.  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19–24 (1991) (a seven-to-one decision 
upholding the Alabama post-verdict judicial review procedures).  In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 
U.S. 415, 418, 432 (1994), a seven-to-two decision, the Court held that Oregon’s failure to provide 
general appellate review of the size of punitive damage awards violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
13.  E.g., O’Gilvie v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1987) (dictum) (“[I]n 
an ordinary remittitur case, the plaintiff must be offered a choice between a new trial and accepting a 
remittitur to avoid a serious problem under the Seventh Amendment, which reserves to the jury the 
determination of damages.”).  For the view that ordering remittitur of a federal jury verdict violates the 
Seventh Amendment, see Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the 
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 763 (2003). 
14.  E.g., Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 413 (2012) (judgment for excessive punitive damages reversed). 
15.  Id. (because only a punitive damage award equal to the compensatory damage award was 
constitutionally permissible, the district court was ordered to enter judgment for that amount).  It is 
more common for an appellate court to reverse a judgment for excessive punitive damages and to 
remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on punitive damages.  E.g., Adams v. Murakami, 813 
P.2d 1348, 1360 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (judgment of the court of appeals reversed and the court of 
appeals directed to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings). 
16.  For a comparison of the American Rule with the English Rule that the loser pays the 
successful party’s attorney’s fees, see John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: 
The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569–90 (1993). 
17.  E.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1394 (4th Cir. 1971) (award of 
successful plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in trade secret litigation reversed in diversity jurisdiction action 
subject to Virginia law).  Absent a special statute or a contract, Virginia only allows recovery of a 
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damage award, however, can reimburse a successful plaintiff’s cost of 
litigation.18 
III.  AMERICAN TRADE SECRET LAW 
A.  The Restatements 
American trade secret law derives from English common law.  In the 1868 
case of Peabody v. Norfolk,19 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, relied 
upon English equity decisions in overruling a general demurrer to a 
supplemental bill in equity.20  The supplemental bill requested an injunction 
against unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s secret method for processing jute 
butts into gunny cloth by a businessman to whom the plaintiff’s former 
employee wrongfully had disclosed it.21 
The 1939 first Restatement of Torts devoted three sections to state trade 
secret law.22  Comment e. to § 757, which addressed remedies, did not mention 
punitive damages.23  Due to the specialized nature of trade secret law, the 1979 
second Restatement of Torts omitted coverage.24  Restatement coverage was 
reinstituted by the 1995 Restatement of Unfair Competition which has seven 
 
successful litigant’s counsel fees if the litigant created a fund for the benefit of a class or obtained 
release from a malicious false imprisonment or successfully defended a malicious prosecution.  See id.  
If the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused the plaintiff to incur attorney’s fees suing a third party, the 
attorney’s fees are compensable damages.  Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den Berg, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602, 
615–616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (a real estate broker whose fraudulent representations induced a 
prospective purchaser to sue the sellers for specific performance liable for the prospective purchaser’s 
attorney’s fees in suing the sellers). This exception does not apply to a co-misappropriator of a trade 
secret.  Id.  
18.  St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35, 40–43 (Md. 1990) 
(following a majority of the state courts that have decided the question, to aid the jury in calculating 
punitive damages evidence of plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees admissible); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 cmt. a. (in awarding punitive damages the trier of fact can consider the 
actual or probable expense incurred by the plaintiff in bringing the action).  Connecticut limits 
common-law punitive damages to a successful plaintiff’s cost of litigation minus taxable costs.  See 
infra note 141.  
19.  Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868). 
20.  Id. at 457–460. 
21.  Id. at 460–461.  The plaintiff died while the suit was pending; his executors continued it.  
Id. at 461.  
22.  4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–759 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939).  Section 757, which dealt 
with liability for the disclosure or use of another’s trade secret, was the basic provision.  Section 758 
dealt with the innocent discovery of another’s trade secret. Section 759 dealt with procuring business 
information by improper means.  Id. 
23.  Id. § 757 cmt. e.  The remedies mentioned were compensatory damages, an accounting for 
profits, an injunction, and surrender of embodiments of a misappropriated trade secret.  Id.  
24.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at 1–2 (stating that trade secret law had become 
independent of tort law). 
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sections on state trade secret law.25  Section 45 on monetary relief focuses upon 
compensatory damages.26  Comment i to § 45 refers readers to the Restatement 
of Torts (Second) for discussion of punitive damages.27 
B.  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act28 (Uniform Act) was proposed by the 
Uniform Law Commission (ULC)29 to fill the gap left by the Restatement of 
Torts (Second) by elaborating the common-law principles reflected in the 1939 
Restatement.30  The ULC initially approved the Uniform Act in 1979.31  Four 
official amendments were adopted in 1985 that did not directly alter the 
provisions dealing with punitive damages and award of attorney’s fees.32 
In the 1995 Restatement of Unfair Competition, the American Law Institute 
adopted a definition of “trade secret” consistent with the Uniform Act.33  
Although there have been nonuniform amendments,34 the ULC reports the 
Uniform Act as having been enacted in 47 states.35 
 
25.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW. INST. 1995). 
26.  Id. § 45.   
27.  Id. § 45 cmt. i. 
28.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, §§ 1–12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529–659 (2005) & 82–
134 (Supp. 2016).  
29.  The ULC was organized in 1892 to promote desirable and practicable uniformity in state 
law.  Commissioners are appointed by each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.  See UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT 14 U.L.A. III–IV (preface). 
30.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 14 U.L.A. at 531 (prefatory note) (stating that the Uniform 
Act provides a unified theory of trade secret protection with a single statute of limitations and 
appropriate remedies).  The 1939 Restatement summarily dealt with remedies and did not address the 
statute of limitations.  See supra notes 22–23.   
31.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1–12, 14 U.L.A. at 529–659. 
32.  Id.  The four Amendments were adopted in response to issues raised by the American Bar 
Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law.  See A.B.A. Sec. Pat., Trademark, & 
Copyright L. Proc. 30–31 (1981) (enacted).  The A.B.A. Section recommended amending § 2(b) to 
limit injunctions allowing future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty to exceptional 
circumstances, amending § 3 to allow reasonable royalty damages if neither a plaintiff’s actual loss 
nor a defendant’s unjust enrichment were provable, amending § 7 to make clear that state remedies for 
breach of contract were not preempted by the Uniform Act, and amending § 11 to clarify that the 
Uniform Act did not apply to a continuing misappropriation that began prior to its effective date.  See 
id.  (Resolutions 206-3–206-6).  The 1985 Amendment authorizing reasonable royalty damages can 
affect the dollar amount of the Uniform Act cap upon punitive damages.  See infra notes 40–41 and 
accompanying text. 
33.  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 states “[a] trade secret is any 
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently 
valuable and secret to afford an actual or a potential economic advantage over others.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39.  “The concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is 
intended to be consistent with the definition of ‘trade secret’ in § 1(4) of the Act.”.  Id. §39, cmt. b. 
34.  For discussion of the pertinent nonuniform amendments, see infra notes 56–72. 
35.  UNIF. LAW COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET-TRADE SECRETS ACT, http://uniform
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C. The Uniform Act Punitive Damage and Attorney’s Fee Provisions 
Uniform Act § 3(b) provides, “If willful and malicious misappropriation 
exists, the court may award exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding 
twice any award made under subsection (a).”36 An Official Comment to § 3 
states in part, “[t]his provision follows federal patent law in leaving 
discretionary trebling to the judge even though there may be a jury, compare 
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976).”37 
The 1979 version of § (3)(a) authorizes recovery of both the loss and unjust 
enrichment damages caused by misappropriation.38 A 1985 Official 
Amendment provides for recovery of a reasonable royalty in lieu of other 
damages.39  If reasonable royalty damages are not sought, two times the total 
loss and unjust enrichment damages recovered is the cap upon punitive 
damages.40  If reasonable royalty damages are recovered, the cap is two times 
their amount.41 
The Uniform Act does not address the plaintiff’s burden of proof.  The 
burden of proof generally required for punitive damages by an enacting state 
applies.42  Although most states require either clear and convincing evidence or 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a number of states retain the traditional 
 
laws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=TradeSecretsAct (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).  The Act has 
yet to be adopted in Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina but has been enacted by the District 
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  Id.   
36.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. at 634. 
37.  Id. § 3(b) official cmt., 14 U.L.A. at 635. 
38.  Id. § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. at 633–634. 
39.  Id. § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. at 634. 
40.  Exemplary damages can be based upon “any award made under subsection (a).”  See UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. at 634 and accompanying text.  Edible Arrangement Int’l v. 
Incredible Franchise Corp., No. 3:07-CV-1788 (WWE), 2010 WL 223488, at *2 (D. Conn. May 25, 
2010), adhered to on reconsideration, No. 3:07-CV-1788 (WWE), 2010 WL 2802368, at *1 (D. Conn. 
July 13, 2010), accordingly was decided incorrectly.  In Edible Arrangement, a trial judge upheld a 
verdict of $150,000 in unjust enrichment damages but refused to award punitive damages, as the jury 
had not found that the plaintiff had been damaged!  Id. 
41.  See, e.g., O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1080 
(N.D. Cal. 2005), judgment amended on other grounds, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 
221 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (award of punitive damages equal to two times the 
lump sum reasonable royalty damages).  The 1979 version of the Uniform Act does not provide for 
reasonable royalty damages.  Under a 1985 Official Amendment, reasonable royalty damages are an 
alternative to loss and unjust enrichment damages.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. at 
633–634.   
42.  Contra, Zawels v. Edutronics, Inc., 520 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act § 7, which displaces conflicting state law, preempted a prior Minnesota statute 
requiring that punitive damages be proved by clear and convincing evidence).  Since the Uniform Act 
does not address a plaintiff’s burden of proof, there in fact was no conflict with the prior Minnesota 
statute.  But see TEX. CIV. PRACT. & REM. CODE § 134A.004(b) (Vernon 2014 Supp. at 52) (Texas 
nonuniform amendment requiring clear and convincing evidence to recover exemplary damages). 
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preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.43  The Uniform Act also does 
not address the plaintiff’s burden of proof with respect to attorney’s fees.  The 
preponderance of the evidence standard typically applies.44  Finally, the 
Uniform Act does not alter a state’s position on whether punitive damages can 
be awarded if compensatory damages are not recovered.45 
Uniform Act § 4 provides in part, “[i]f . . . willful and malicious 
misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party.”46  This aspect of § 4 authorizes award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff.  Awards can include attorney’s fees 
 
43.  1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 7, at 893.  E.g., Spinks v. Equity Residential 
Briarwood Apartments, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (California statute requires 
proof by clear and convincing evidence); Qwest Serv. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071, 1092 (Colo. 
2011) (en banc) (Colorado requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt); United Nuclear Corp. v. 
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 649, 653–654 (N. M. 1985) (New Mexico requires a preponderance 
of the evidence.). 
44.  E.g., Ateco v. Hales Eng’g Co., 2d Civil No. B188802, 2008 WL 484443, at *4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 25, 2008) (“Employing the . . . ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard of proof, the 
jury . . . found that appellants did not act with malice or oppression.  The trial court, on the other hand, 
employed the less stringent preponderance of the evidence standard to determine that ATECO was 
entitled to recover its attorney fees because the appellant’s misappropriation was willful and 
malicious . . . .”).  Under the Patent Code, the United States Supreme Court recently ruled unanimously 
that the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof applies to award of attorney’s fees.  Octane 
Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014). 
45.  E.g., Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, LLC, No. 08-0840-CV-W-ODS, 
2013 WL 1164092, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2013) (alternative holding), aff’d on other grounds, 758 
F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2014) (nothing in MUTSA “clearly” abrogates the common-law rule or permits an 
award of punitive damages where the defendant is found not to have caused actual damages). Some 
states do not require recovery of compensatory damages for punitive damages to be awarded.  E.g., 
Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1262 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (“A majority of the 
Court . . . concludes that an award of compensatory damages is not a prerequisite to a finding of 
entitlement to punitive damages.”).  Moreover, more traditional authority supports the award of 
punitive damages upon nominal damages than opposes it. 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 7, at 
392–393 (“There is more authority supporting the view that nominal damages will sustain a punitive 
award.”). 
46.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4(iii), 14 U.L.A. at 642.  The omitted § 4 language gives a 
court discretion to award attorney’s fees if a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or a motion 
to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith.  Id. § 4(i)–(ii).  In the omitted instances, 
attorney’s fees could be awarded to a prevailing defendant.  However, under the aspect of § 4 that is 
discussed in the text, attorney’s fees can be awarded only to a prevailing plaintiff.  Under the Patent 
Code, the United States Supreme Court recently ruled unanimously that attorney’s fee awards are to 
be based upon either the strength of a party’s litigating position or the unreasonable manner in which 
the case was litigated.  Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). The Federal Circuit’s view that 
there either must have been independently sanctionable misconduct or the litigation both must have 
been brought in subjective bad faith and must have been “objectively baseless” was rejected as an 
“inflexible framework.”  Id.   
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incurred prior to filing suit47 and on appeal,48 but are limited to attorney’s fees 
related to successful trade secret misappropriation claims.49  An Official 
Comment observes, “[a]gain, patent law is followed in allowing the judge to 
determine whether attorney’s fees should be awarded even if there is a jury, 
compare 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976).”50 
In view of the clarity with which the Uniform Act makes the award of 
punitive damages and a successful plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees 
discretionary even though “willful and malicious misappropriation” has been 
proved,51 the Rhode Island Supreme Court decision in McFarland v. Brier52 is 
difficult to understand.  The Rhode Island Court treated both awards as 
automatic upon a finding of willful and malicious misappropriation, with 
punitive damages automatically imposed at the cap level!53 
D. Nonuniform Amendments 
James Pooley has commented, “[t]he major drawback of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act is that it is not uniform.”54 Although Pooley overstates its 
significance, nonuniformity there surely is.  To begin with, four states omit the 
 
47.  E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956–957 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(awardable fees “include time spent preparing ‘the initial pleadings and the work associated with 
development of the theory of the case’ . . . . It can also include hours spent on pre-filing factual 
investigation that are ‘equivalent to the time that would have been spent’ later in the litigation.”). 
48.  E.g., Bond v. Polycycle, Inc., 732 A.2d 970, 979–980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) 
(attorney’s fees on appeal were directly related to the defendant’s willful and malicious conduct); 
Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 670 (Wash. 1987) (remand for determination of plaintiff’s 
reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal); McFarland v. Brier, No. 96-1007, 2001 WL 1097779 at *5 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2001) (appellate attorney’s fees properly are included). 
49.  E.g., Great Am. Opportunities, Inc. v. Cherrydale Fundraising, LLC, Civil Action No. 
3718-VCP, 2010 WL 338219, at *29 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2010) (because approximately one-half the 
case was devoted to a claim for tortious interference with contract and business relations, one-half the 
requested attorney’s fees awarded); Boeing Co., 738 P.2d at 682–683 (plaintiff not entitled to award 
of fees related to antitrust counterclaim). 
50.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4 cmt., 14 U.L.A. at 642. 
51.  E.g., Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 315–316 (Iowa 1998) (the jury found the 
defendant’s conduct to be willful and malicious but the trial judge did not award punitive damages); 
Chetu, Inc. v. Salihu, No. 09-60588-CIV, 2010 WL 2680088, at ** 2–3 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2010) (motion 
to award attorney’s fees denied with respect to plaintiff awarded punitive damages).  But cf. Jurgens 
v. CBK Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572–1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (if there has been a jury finding of willful 
infringement, a trial judge should give a plausible reason for not awarding punitive damages or 
attorney’s fees). 
52.  See McFarland v. Brier, 769 A.2d 605 (R.I. 2001). 
53.  Id. at 612–613.  Upon remand, a Rhode Island Superior Court Judge entered a judgment 
imposing joint and several liability upon two corporations and an individual for $478,980 in 
compensatory damages, $302,760 in punitive damages, and $401,090 in attorney’s fees.  McFarland 
v. Brier, No. 96-107, 2001 WL 1097779, at *5-6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2001).   
54.  28 JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03(7)(b) (Law Journal Press 2012). 
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punitive damages provision 55 and six states omit the attorney’s fees provision.56 
To the extent that the § 3(b) punitive damage provision was modified, the 
most common change was alteration of the two times other damages cap upon 
punitive damages.  Four states deleted the cap,57 one state raised it,58 and three 
states lowered it.59 Four states replaced the “willful and malicious 
misappropriation” prerequisite to the award of punitive damages with a 
condition intended to express the common law, like “willful, wanton, or 
reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.”60  Two other states modified the 
prerequisite: Oregon adopted “willful or malicious”61 and Vermont adopted 
“malicious.”62  Finally, four states authorized a jury as well as a judge to award 
punitive damages.63  In addition to these express changes in the punitive 
damage provision, in the five states that retain the 1979 version of the Uniform 
Act, reasonable royalty damages are not an alternative basis for computing the 
punitive damages cap.64 
 
55.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601–4-75-607 (Lexis Nexis 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
51:1431–51:1439 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1901–445.1910 (West 2002 & Supp. 
2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-501 to 87-507 (2008). 
56.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.910; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35–54 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE 
ANN.  § 48-801–48-807 (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450 to 417.467 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2014); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-501 to 87-507 (2008); and VT. STAT. ANN.  tit. 9, § 4601–4609 (2006 & 
Supp. 2013). 
57.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-26-7(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2013); MO. STAT. ANN. § 417.457(2) 
(West 2001 & Supp. 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-404(2) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, § 4603(b) (Lexis Nexis 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
58.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.63(B) (punitive damages cannot exceed three times the 
other damages recovered). 
59.  ALA. CODE § 8-27-4(a)(3) (Supp. 2013) (punitive damages capped at one times the other 
damages awarded with a minimum of $10,000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-104(2) (2013) 
(punitive damages capped at one times the other damages awarded); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-338(B) 
(2006) (punitive damages cannot exceed two times compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is 
less). 
60.  Two states approximated this formulation.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.050(2) (Lexis-
Nexis 2010) (“willful, wanton, or reckless misappropriation or disregard of the rights of the owner of 
the trade secret”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-40(C) (Supp. 2013) (“willful, wanton, or reckless disregard 
of the plaintiff’s rights”).  See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-104(2) (2013) (“fraud, malice, or 
a willful and wanton disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings”); MO. STAT. ANN. § 
417.457(2) (2001 & Supp. 2014) (outrageous misappropriation “because of the misappropriator’s evil 
motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others”). 
61.  OR. REV. STAT. § 646.465(3) (2011) (“willful or malicious misappropriation”). 
62.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4603(b) (2006 & Supp. 2013) (“malicious misappropriation”). 
63.  ALA. CODE § 8-27-4(a)(3) (Supp. 2013) (deletion of reference to “the court”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-74-104(2) (2013) (reference to “the court or the jury”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.465(3) 
(2011) (deletion of reference to “the court”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 134A.004(b) 
(West 2014) (reference to “the fact finder”). 
64.  Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, and Washington have the initial version of 
Uniform § 3, which does not provide for alternative reasonable royalty damages.  ALASKA STAT. § 
45.50.915(a) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-606 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-53(a) (West 
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Insofar as the § 4 attorney’s fees provision was retained but modified, four 
states also authorized a court to award costs to a prevailing plaintiff,65 with 
California and New Jersey defining “costs” to include the reasonable fees of 
expert witnesses.66 Two states altered the “willful and malicious 
misappropriation” prerequisite to the award of attorney’s fees.  Oregon referred 
to “willful or malicious misappropriation”67 and South Carolina to “willful 
misappropriation.”68  Finally, two states authorized a jury to award a successful 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.69 
A number of the non-uniform amendments resulted from integration of the 
Uniform Act with a state’s general punitive damage reforms.70  Nebraska alone 
omitted both the punitive damages provision and the attorney’s fees 
provision.71 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. The Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial with Respect to Punitive 
Damages and Attorney’s Fees 
The Uniform Act punitive damages and reasonable attorney’s fee 
provisions follow the Patent Code in making these awards discretionary with 
 
2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1433 (2012); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.030(1) (West 
2013). 
65.  CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3426.4 (West 2014 & Supp. at 63); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-
405 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-6(a) (West 2012); tit. 12. PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 5305 (West 2014 & Supp. at 270) (expenses and costs). 
66.  CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3426.4 (West 2014 & Supp. at 63); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-6(a) 
(West 2012). 
67.  OR. REV. STAT. § 646.467(3) (2011). 
68.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-80(3) (Supp. 2013). 
69.  ALA. CODE ANN. § 8-27-4(a)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (deletion of reference to “the 
court”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.467(3) (2011) (reference to “the court or jury”). 
70.  The Virginia nonuniform amendment limiting punitive damages to two times the 
compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is less, conformed the Uniform Act to the general 
Virginia cap upon punitive damages. See supra note 59; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2007) (total 
amount of punitive damages against all defendants in a case limited to $350,000).  Integration also has 
taken place through judicial decision.  E.g., ICE Corp. v. Hamilton Sunstrand Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 
1266, 1270–1271 (D. Kan. 2009), rev’d, 432 F. App’x 732, 739–740 (10th Cir. 2011) (reversing the 
trial judge’s ruling that the general Kansas limitations upon the amount of punitive damages did not 
supersede the Uniform Act special treatment of punitive damages).  Over half the states have adopted 
legislation limiting the recovery of punitive damages.  The limitations include requiring a higher 
burden of proof, capping the maximum dollar amount, requiring partial distribution of a punitive 
damage award to a public entity like the State Treasurer or a Tort Victims Compensation Fund, and 
precluding punitive damage awards against particular defendants like doctors or public officials acting 
within their authority.  1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 7, ch. 21.  
71.  See supra notes 55–56. 
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the trial court even though a jury has been impaneled.72  In federal diversity 
jurisdiction cases and in some states, though, there is a constitutional right to a 
jury trial with respect to both liability for and the amount of punitive damages 
that supersedes the Uniform Act’s delegation of discretion to a trial judge.73  
This will be illustrated by the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in federal 
diversity cases.74  Although the Patent Code antecedents of the Uniform Act 
provisions may not to be subject to a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial,75 
their status involves a judicial deference to the federal patent system76 that does 
not apply to the Uniform Act. 
 The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial in federal courts 
that existed in suits at common law involving more than twenty dollars when 
the Amendment became effective in 1791.77  A Seventh Amendment right to 
 
72.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 3(b) & 4(iii), 14 U.L.A. at 634, 642 (“the court may”).  See 
supra notes 37 & 50 for Uniform Act Official Comments referring to the Patent Code counterparts of 
these provisions.  
73.  E.g., Capital Solutions, LLC v. Konica Minolta Bus. Solutions U.S.A., 695 F. Supp. 2d 
1149 (D. Kan. 2010) (in which a federal district judge granted a plaintiff’s motion for a jury 
determination of the amount of punitive damages on Seventh Amendment grounds.  A Kansas tort 
reform statute providing for a trial judge to determine the amount of punitive damages was held to be 
superseded.)  Id. at 1152–1156 (noting the Kansas Supreme Court, on the other hand, has ruled that 
the Kansas statute allocating determination of the amount of punitive damages to the court does not 
abridge the Kansas right to trial by jury.).  Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 994 (Kan. 1993). 
(“Compensatory damages fall into the category of a remedy at common law . . . . [H]owever, punitive 
damages were not considered a remedy at common law, but merely incident to those causes of action 
in tort requesting compensatory damages.”).  
74.  See also Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 401–02 (Ohio 1994) (Ohio statute 
providing that a trial court determines the amount of punitive damages violated the Ohio constitutional 
right to trial by jury).  
75.  See Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 (1876) (“Juries, in an action at law for the infringement 
of a patent, are required to find the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the 
unlawful acts of the defendant.  Power is given to the court, in such a case, to enter judgment for any 
sum above the amount of the verdict, not exceeding three times the amount of the same, together with 
costs; but the jury are strictly limited in their finding to the actual damages which the plaintiff has 
sustained by the infringement.”). In Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Lab., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986), 
without citing the Seventh Amendment, the Federal Circuit rejected a trial judge’s ruling that a jury 
verdict of willful infringement was merely advisory with respect to enhanced damages.  Unless the 
jury verdict was overturned on a motion for JNOV, the Federal Circuit panel held that the trial judge 
was bound by the verdict.  Id. at 1568.  See contra B.D. Daniel, The Right of Trial by Jury in Patent 
Infringement Cases, 28 REV. LITIG. 735, 775–787 (2009) (contending that the Federal Circuit 
unnecessarily allows juries to determine the willfulness of infringement with respect to enhanced 
damages). 
76.  Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, The Seventh 
Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 225 (1991) (“In both civil penalty 
and patent cases the Court has approved of judicial assessment of discretionary damages that serve a 
punitive purpose. These cases, however, are best seen in light of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, in which 
the Court weighs the government’s interest against the otherwise clear requirements of the 
Constitution. Public rights doctrine is a ‘complexity exception’ to the Seventh Amendment . . . .”). 
77.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  E.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417, 421 (1987) (To 
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jury trial exists in federal diversity jurisdiction cases applying state substantive 
law.78  Furthermore, significant federal authority recognizes a Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial with respect to the amount of punitive damages.  
For example, in Defender Industries, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Co.,79 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
unanimously held that “the seventh amendment guarantees the right to a jury 
determination of the amount of punitive damages.”80 The Fourth Circuit 
reversed and remanded the trial judge’s reduction to $10,000 of a jury’s five 
million punitive damage award.81  The court overruled its prior precedent 
allowing a trial judge that had submitted liability for punitive damages to a jury 
to disregard the amount of the jury verdict.82  The Tenth Circuit is in accord,83 
and at least four federal district courts have refused to strike a jury demand with 
respect to a claim for punitive damages.84 
 
determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to 
suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both the nature of the action and of 
the remedy sought . . . . [C]haracterizing the relief sought is ‘[m]ore important’ than finding a precisely 
analogous common-law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a 
jury trial.”). 
78.  Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam) (“We agree with respondent that 
the right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity 
as well as other actions.”). 
79.  Def. Indus., Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
80.  Id. at 507. 
81.  Id. at 503, 508–509. 
82.  Id. at 505–507. 
83.  Jones v. United Postal Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1202–1206 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming 
the trial court’s denial of a request for a new trial on the ground that the amount of punitive damages 
improperly had been determined by a jury). Under Kansas law that otherwise applied in this diversity 
case, a trial judge and not a jury was required to determine the amount of punitive damages.  See id. at 
1202. The Seventh Amendment governs the right to jury trial in federal diversity cases, however.  See 
Simler, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).  The Kansas Supreme Court has held that the Kansas statute requiring a 
trial judge to determine the amount of punitive damages does not infringe the Kansas right to jury trial.  
Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 994 (Kan. 1993) (“Because a plaintiff does not have a right to punitive 
damages, the legislature could, without infringing upon a plaintiff’s basic constitutional rights, abolish 
punitive damages.  If the legislature may abolish punitive damages, then it also may, without impinging 
upon the right to trial by jury, accomplish anything short of that.”).  
84.  Todd v. Roadway Express, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1246 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (“It is the 
function of the jury to determine the amount of punitive damages once it has determined that an award 
of punitive damages is proper.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 
1313 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (“[T]he right-to-jury clause of the Seventh Amendment extends the right of trial 
by jury in this case to the determination of the amount of punitive damages, if any, to which the 
defendants may be entitled. . . .”); Montgomery v. Karkut Indus. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955 (E.D. 
Mo. 2003) (“It remains a jury function to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
punitive damages, and to decide the amount of that award.”); Capital Solutions, LLC v. Konica Minolta 
Bus. Solutions U.S.A., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155–56 (D. Kan. 2010) (“[T]he Court concludes that 
the Seventh Amendment guarantees Capital the right to have the entirety of its claim for punitive 
damages, including the determination of the amount, decided by the jury.”).  See also E.I. DuPont v. 
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In some states, a constitutional right to a jury trial exists with respect to 
whether the Uniform Act’s “willful and malicious misappropriation” 
prerequisite to the award of punitive damages is satisfied but not with respect 
to the amount of punitive damages.85  In those states, exercise of the right to a 
jury trial will supersede a trial judge’s discretion only with respect to whether 
misappropriation was willful and malicious.  A trial judge will retain discretion 
with respect to whether punitive damages should be awarded and their 
amount.86  Finally, in states in which there is no constitutional right to a jury 
trial with respect to punitive damages, a trial judge will determine whether 
misappropriation was willful and malicious, and, if so, whether punitive 
damages should be awarded and their amount.87 
In most jurisdictions,88 a consequence of the exercise of the right to a jury 
trial with respect to punitive damages is either an optional or a mandatory 
bifurcation of the jury trial.89  The purpose of a bifurcated jury trial is to prevent 
prejudicial evidence, including evidence of the defendant’s wealth, from 
affecting the jury’s determination of the defendant’s liability for compensatory 
and punitive damages.90  In a common bifurcation procedure, a jury initially 
hears evidence of liability for compensatory damages, the amount of 
compensatory damages, and liability for punitive damages (the existence of 
willful and malicious misappropriation), and makes findings on these issues.  If 
 
Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-58, 2011 WL 5872895, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2011) (“Here, Kolon 
waived its right to have punitive damages assessed by the jury and agreed to have the issue submitted 
to the Court.”). 
85.  Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 315–316 (Iowa 1998) (the jury found the 
defendant’s conduct willful and malicious, but the trial judge determined whether punitive damages 
would be awarded). 
86.  Id. (the jury found the defendant’s conduct to be willful and malicious but the trial judge 
declined to award punitive damages).  
87.  Cf. Printup, 866 P.2d at 997–998 (Kansas statute requiring a trial judge to determine the 
amount of punitive damages even though a jury had been impaneled valid under the Kansas 
Constitution.). 
88.  Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, and Wisconsin have statutes permitting separate trial of 
different claims but not separate trial of different issues with respect to a single claim.  According to 
the weight of authority, punitive damages are an incident of an underlying claim and not an 
independent claim.  1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 7, § 12.8.  On the other hand, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
42(b) permits discretionary separate trial of different issues with respect to a single claim. 
89.  E.g., Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(“[B]ifurcation of the amount of punitive damages . . . [is] the ‘preferred method’ . . . but . . . ultimately 
[is left] to the discretion of the district judge.”); Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 
1081, 1087–1088 (N.J. 1993) (New Jersey product liability legislation requiring bifurcation of the 
determination of compensatory and punitive damages). 
90.  Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994) (“[E]vidence of a defendant’s 
net worth, which is generally relevant only to the amount of punitive damages, by highlighting the 
relative wealth of a defendant, has a very real potential for prejudicing the jury’s determination of other 
disputed issues in a tort case.”). 
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the jury finds willful and malicious misappropriation, the same jury is then 
presented evidence pertaining to the amount of punitive damages, including 
evidence of the defendant’s financial condition.  In determining the amount of 
punitive damages, the jury considers the evidence admitted in both stages of 
the trial.91 
The Uniform Act provision giving a trial judge discretion with respect to 
the award of a successful plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees is a different 
story.  When the Seventh Amendment was adopted, states had legislation 
authorizing courts to tax nominal attorney’s fees as costs to the losing party.92  
In litigation under the Uniform Act, federal and state trial judges will rule on 
the award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a successful plaintiff even if there is 
a jury verdict with respect to the presence or absence of willful and malicious 
misappropriation.93  Indeed, with respect to punitive damages a jury usually 
must find that willful and malicious misappropriation existed according to 
either clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 
whereas, with respect to attorney’s fees, a trial judge can make this finding upon 
the basis of a preponderance of the evidence.94  A trial judge accordingly could 
award attorney’s fees even though a jury had found that willful and malicious 
misappropriation had not been proved by clear and convincing evidence or 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.95 
 
91.  Id. at 29–30.  Another possible approach is a “trifurcated trial.”  In a trifurcated trial, a jury 
determines liability and amount of compensatory damages in the first phase, liability for punitive 
damages in the second phase, and the amount of punitive damages in the third phase.  E.g., Webster v. 
Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459, 461 (Ga. 1998).  In Webster, the Georgia Supreme Court described trifurcation 
as an option in rare cases.  Id. at 463–464.  For discussion of bifurcation and trifurcation, see Andrew 
L. Frey, Evan M. Tager, & Lauren R. Goldman, 4 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 45.10 (3d. ed. 
2013).   
92.  Vargo, supra note 16, at 1570–1575 (“By the beginning of the new Union, it is fairly 
evident that the new states had adopted a type of fee shifting that benefited the litigation winner.”). 
93.  E.g., Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., No. 99-C-4334, 2002 WL 23826, at *1, *7 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2002) (a jury awarded punitive damages against defendant Berkovitz for engaging in 
willful and malicious conduct but the trial judge declined to impose liability for the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees); Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 401–02 (Ohio 1994) (“We believe the 
right to have a jury assess punitive damages differs from the right to have a jury assess attorney’s fees.  
With punitive damages, the right stems from the common law; however no such right existed at 
common law for attorney’s fees.”); Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 315–316 (Iowa 1998) 
(affirming the trial judge’s denial of attorney’s fees notwithstanding the jury’s finding of willful and 
malicious conduct).  In federal court diversity jurisdiction cases, state law determines whether 
attorney’s fees are to be awarded.  ICE Corp., 432 F. App’x 732, 741 (10th Cir. 2011) (“In diversity 
cases, attorney’s fees are controlled by state law.”). 
94.  See supra notes 43–44 for discussion of the burden of proof with respect to the award of 
punitive damages and attorney’s fees.  
95.  S.O. Tech/Special Operations Technologies, Inc. v. Berge, B243795, 2013 WL 5563757, 
at **1–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2013) (Because the burdens of proof were different, the trial judge was 
not bound by the jury’s determination that the misappropriation was not willful and malicious). 
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B.  Constitutional Limitations Upon the Award of Punitive Damages and 
Attorney’s Fees 
1.  The Supreme Court Cases 
Both the blameworthy conduct for which punitive damages are appropriate 
and its vague contours invite large awards.  This has led the United States 
Supreme Court to impose a constitutional prohibition upon excessive punitive 
damages.  In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,96 a 
six-to-three opinion written by Mr. Justice Kennedy, a majority of the Court 
reversed and remanded the Utah Supreme Court’s affirmance of a judgment 
upon a jury verdict for $145 million in punitive damages and $1 million in 
compensatory damages.  The defendant was an insurer whose refusal to settle 
claims had resulted in a judgment against the insureds substantially in excess 
of policy limits.97  The majority opinion stressed that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state imposition of grossly excessive 
or arbitrary punishment upon a tortfeasor.98  The opinion reaffirmed the three 
guideposts for testing the constitutional excessiveness of punitive damage 
awards in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore:99 (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual 
or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages 
awarded; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded and the 
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases, with the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct being most important.100  Although 
declining to adopt a “bright-line ratio,” the Campbell majority suggested 
punitive damages that were four times the economic loss proved ordinarily 
would be the constitutional limit and observed that “few awards exceeding a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant 
degree, will satisfy due process.”101  The majority also said that “[w]hen 
 
96.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (1973).  The guideposts were 
first articulated in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–575 (1996).  In Campbell, 
the majority opinion referred to them as the “Gore guideposts.”  Id. at 429.   
97.  Id. at 412–416.  
98.  Id. at 416. 
99.  BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
100. Id. at 574–575; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418. 
101. Campbell, 538 U.S at 425.  On remand, the Utah Supreme Court focused upon U.S. 
Supreme Court’s reference to a 9:1 ratio and approved $9,018,780 in punitive damages and $1,000,000 
in compensatory damages.  Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 419–420 (Utah 
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874 (2004).  On the other hand, following remand of the Gore case by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court had disregarded the preferred ratios and 
approved $50,000 in punitive damages and $4,000 in compensatory damages, an over 12 to 1 ratio.  
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 509, 515 (Ala. 1997) (per curiam).  These 
decisions upon remand raised concern that state courts would not adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
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compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal 
to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process 
guarantee.”102 
The United States Supreme Court requires federal appellate courts to 
review de novo federal trial court compliance with the Gore/Campbell 
guideposts.103  Several states likewise require de novo appellate review of trial 
court application of the guideposts.104 
The Supreme Court has an alternative basis for substantive due process 
review of punitive damage judgments.  In Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. 
Williams,105 an action by the widow of a heavy smoker against the manufacturer 
of her deceased husband’s brand of cigarettes, five justices held that the Due 
 
evolving excessive punitive damages doctrine.  However, an analysis of over 500 lower court punitive 
damage awards reported subsequent to the Campbell decision concluded that, except for a handful of 
high profile remand cases, there was “virtually no evidence” of lack of lower court fidelity to the 
constitutional guideposts.  N. William Hines, Marching to a Different Drummer: Are Lower Courts 
Faithfully Implementing the Evolving Due Process Guideposts to Catch and Correct Excessive 
Punitive Damage Awards, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 371, 404 (2013). 
 Courts reading Campbell and Gore as indicating that a ratio of 4:1 is the presumptive 
constitutional ceiling include Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 363 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(“While suggesting that ratios alone cannot control the analysis, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
intimated that a four-to-one ratio is likely to survive any due process challenges given the historic use 
of double, treble, and quadruple damages as a punitive remedy.”); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 
801 F. Supp. 2d 950, 955 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A]s a general matter, a proper exemplary damages award 
can equal four times the compensatory damages award.”); Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 179 P.3d 645, 
670 (Or. 2008) (“This case fully justifies the highest permissible award, viz. an award that is four times 
the amount of plaintiff’s actual and potential harm . . . .”). 
102.  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.  This comment was reinforced by Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Exxon Valdez case.  In Exxon, a 
five-to-three majority of the Supreme Court exercising the Court’s role as an arbiter of U.S. maritime 
law vacated a decision of the Ninth Circuit ordering a reduction of punitive damages to $2.5 billion 
and directed that the punitive damages be reduced to a sum equal to the $507.5 million in compensatory 
damages recovered in the trial court.  Id. at 481, 514-515. Accord, Jones v. United Postal Serv., Inc., 
674 F.3d 1187, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 413 (2012) (Campbell requires that 
punitive damages equal a substantial compensatory award). 
103.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (“[C]ourts 
of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’ determinations 
of the constitutionality of punitive damage awards.”) (8-1 decision). 
104.  E.g., Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483, 493–494 (Ky. 2002), 
judgment vacated and case remanded on other grounds, 538 U.S. 1028 (2003) (mem.) (Cooper 
Industries decision applies to state courts); Aken v. Plains Elec. Gen. & Trans. Coop, 49 P.3d 662, 668 
(N.M. 2002) (Cooper Industries decision applies to state courts). 
105.  Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).  The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the Williams case three times.  Williams I remanded the case to the Oregon courts to 
consider the effect of the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision.  Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 
540 U.S. 801 (2003) (mem.).  The case discussed in the text is Williams II.  Finally, in Williams III, 
the Court dismissed as improvident its grant of certiorari with respect to the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
decision following the remand ordered by Williams II.  Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 556 U.S. 
178 (2009) (per curiam). 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a punitive damage award 
punishing the defendant for injury to nonparties to the litigation.106  The specific 
constitutional flaw was procedural, the state trial judge’s rejection of a proposed 
jury charge stating “you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its 
alleged misconduct on other persons . . . .”107  The charge given was “[p]unitive 
damages are awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct and to deter 
misconduct,” and “are not intended to compensate the plaintiff or anyone else 
for damages caused by the defendant’s conduct.”108  The Court majority 
concluded that “the Due Process Clause requires States to provide assurance 
that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e. seeking, not simply to 
determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused strangers.”109  
Williams demonstrates that inadequate procedure can invalidate a punitive 
damage award even if punitive damages were warranted and the award was not 
excessive.110 
2.  The Constitutionality of the Uniform Act Punitive Damages and 
Attorney’s Fees Provisions 
a.  Willful and Malicious Misappropriation 
The Uniform Act makes the existence of “willful and malicious 
misappropriation” a condition precedent to the award of punitive damages and 
attorney’s fees.111  Official Comments indicate that the approach is similar to 
that of discretionary provisions in the Patent Code without indicating that the 
Patent Code concept of “willful infringement” is followed.112 
The leading Federal Circuit case on willful infringement under both the 
 
106.  Williams, 549 U.S. at 353. 
107.  Id. at 356.  
108.  Id. at 351. 
109.  Id. at 355.  The Supreme Court also had granted certiorari with respect to the amount of 
the punitive damage award but the majority opinion limited its holding to the adequacy of the jury 
instructions.  Id. at 352. 
110.  Melissa Michelle Davis, Procedural Protections in Punitive Damage Cases: Ensuring 
that Juries Are Asking the Right Questions About Wealth Evidence, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1119, 1138 
(2008) (“[Williams] confirms that inadequate procedures can invalidate a punitive damages award, 
even where punitive damages are warranted, and even where such procedures do not necessarily result 
in a constitutionally excessive award.”). 
111.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 3(b)–(4), 14 U.L.A. at 634, 642. Both ill will and 
misappropriation must exist.  Ill will alone is not enough.  Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, 919 A.2d 421, 
444 (Conn. 2007) (“Ruschmeyer could not have violated the CUTSA maliciously merely by planning 
to purchase Lydall, regardless of whether he harbored animus toward his fellow corporate officers and 
members of the board of directors or intended to injure them.”). 
112.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 3–4 cmts., 14 U.L.A. at 635, 642. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–85 
(2012) give a trial judge discretion to award damages of up to three times the amount found to exist 
and also to award reasonable attorney’s fees. 
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Patent Code multiple damages and attorney’s fee provisions is In re Seagate 
Technology, LLC.113  The Seagate test is: 
[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high 
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent . . . . 
The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this 
objective inquiry.  If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the 
patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk 
(determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) 
was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the 
accused infringer.114 
The 2007 Seagate decision repudiated the understanding of Patent Code 
“willful infringement” emerging when the Uniform Act was adopted.115  The 
Uniform Act’s “willful and malicious misappropriation” could not have been 
intended to incorporate the more recent Seagate test.  Moreover, Seagate 
explains why the prior Federal Circuit view of willful infringement was 
inappropriate.  The prior test was akin to negligence116 and insufficient 
justification for awarding punitive damages and attorney’s fees in a nonpatent 
context. 
The “willful and malicious misappropriation” that justifies the award of 
punitive damages and reasonable attorney’s fees is more than ordinary 
misappropriation.117  The something more is either intentional misappropriation 
 
113.  In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  Seagate 
involved Patent Code § 284 (enhanced damages).  The Seagate analysis was applied by the Federal 
Circuit to a Patent Code § 285 case (attorney’s fees) involving allegedly groundless litigation. 
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1308–1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).  For an empirical study of the effect of 
Seagate, see Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re 
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417 (2012). 
114.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.  A Federal Circuit panel subsequently ruled that the objective 
prong of the Seagate test for willful infringement was to be decided by the trial judge as a matter of 
law and was reviewable de novo upon appeal.  Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., 
682 F.3d 1003, 1006–1007 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he objective determination of recklessness, even 
though predicated on underlying mixed questions of law and fact, is best decided by the judge as a 
question of law subject to de novo review.”).  
115.  See Danny Prati, In Re Seagate Technology, LLC: A Clean Slate for Willfulness, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47, 62 (2008) (the pre-Seagate precedent had applied for over 20 years). 
116.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (the prior test was “more akin to negligence”). 
117.  Cacique, Inc. v. Stella Foods, Inc., No. B3139433, 2002 WL 705675, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 
April 24, 2002) (“[W]e agree with defendants that the phrase [willful and malicious misappropriation] 
must mean something more that the act of misappropriation itself.”). 
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or conscious disregard of another’s known trade secret rights.118  Uniform Act 
misappropriation also can result from having “reason to know” that knowledge 
of a trade secret had been acquired through improper means.119  But “reason to 
know” misappropriation does not warrant the award of either punitive damages 
or attorney’s fees.120   
b.  Application of the Gore/Campbell Guideposts 
The Uniform Act caps maximum punitive damages at two times the 
compensatory damages recovered,121 which is within the Campbell 
presumption of constitutionality.  The Act does not provide for nominal 
damages.122  The constitutionality of awarding punitive damages upon nominal 
damages will not arise.123 
 
118.  Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat’l Chemical Co., 87 F.3d 937, 946 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“[Willful and malicious misappropriation] surely must include an intentional misappropriation as well 
as a misappropriation resulting from the conscious disregard of the rights of another.”); accord, 
Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 730 (7th Cir. 2003).  See also Agilent 
Tech., Inc. v. Kirkland, CA No. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL 610725, at *34 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010) (“First, 
the defendants acted willfully because they knew that Agilent’s bonding, slurry solvent, and 
multilayering information were confidential, and were aware of the potential consequences of using 
those trade secrets . . . Second, Kirkland, DeStefano, and Langlois acted maliciously.  They acted with 
the intent to cause commercial injury to Agilent by creating a product based on Agilent’s trade secrets 
to compete with Agilent.”).  Conscious disregard of the known trade secret rights of another hereinafter 
will be referred to as “conscious-disregard misappropriation.” Id. 
119.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)((i)–(ii)(B)(I), (III), 14 U.L.A. at 537. 
120.  The Model Punitive Damages Act does not permit an award of punitive damages unless 
“the plaintiff has established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant maliciously intended 
to cause the injury or consciously and flagrantly disregarded the rights or interests of others in causing 
the injury . . . .” Id. § 5(a)(2), 14 U.L.A. 325 (2005).  The Official Comment explains:  
Paragraph 2 essentially paraphrases the language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
describing the bases for punitive awards.  However, it differs from the Restatement in one 
regard.  It does not encompass the situation, as does the Restatement, where the actor, from 
facts which he or she knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may 
result.  Although contained in the definition of “reckless” conduct in Section 500 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, this language sounds more in negligence and would permit, 
in the opinion of the Drafting Committee, cases to go to the jury without proof of the type of 
state of mind which should be required to warrant punitive damages. 
Id. at 325–326.  The Prefatory Note to the Model Punitive Damages Act reviews the initial seven 
United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with punitive damages up to and including BMW v. 
Gore.  Id. at 315–319. Its provisions are intended to be consistent with the constitutional underpinning 
of Gore, the guideposts of which continue to express prevailing U.S. Supreme Court doctrine.  See 
supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
121.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. at 634. 
122.  Alphamed Pharm. Corp. v. Arriva Pharm., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1334–1339 (S.D. 
Fla. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 294 F. App’x 501 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating jury verdict of liability for 
nominal damages). 
123.  Cf. Fastenal Co. v. Crawford, 609 F. Supp. 2d 650, 658, 669–671 (E.D. Ky. 2009) 
(punitive damages awarded on fraud claim notwithstanding jury award of $0 compensatory damages 
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But, the punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio is only one of the 
three Gore/Campbell guideposts and not the most important one.124  
In Campbell, Mr. Justice Kennedy explained: 
[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive 
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct . . . . We have instructed courts to determine the 
reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm 
caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct 
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety 
of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the 
conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the 
harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere 
accident . . . . The existence of any one of these factors weighing in 
favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages 
award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.125 
There is an issue under the Gore/Campbell line of United States Supreme 
Court cases how “reprehensible” deliberate and conscious disregard trade 
secret misappropriation is.  In trade secret misappropriation cases, the harm 
ordinarily is economic; no personal injuries typically are involved; the health 
or safety of others is not necessarily affected; and the target of the 
misappropriation may or may not be financially vulnerable.126  The factor most 
likely to exist in addition to deliberate or conscious disregard misappropriation 
is repeated, profitable misconduct.127  Both Gore and Campbell indicate that 
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than isolated misconduct.128 
The reprehensiveness of profitable misconduct that is repeated for a 
substantial period of time is illustrated by Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.129 In 
Johnson, the purchasers of a used Taurus from a dealer acting for Ford sued 
Ford for concealing the Taurus’ history of transmission malfunction and repair.  
 
constitutional when aggregate compensatory damages on all claims was compared with aggregate 
punitive damages on all claims). 
124.  See supra note 100. 
125.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
126.  Plaintiffs in trade secret cases can be large corporations.  E.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin 
Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 671 (Wash. 1987) (major airplane manufacturer plaintiff; defendant, one of three 
major U.S. suppliers of aircraft windows).   
127.  See supra note 125 for Justice Kennedy’s discussion of reprehensibility. 
128.  BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996) (“Our holdings that a 
recidivist may punished more severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more 
reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (it is relevant 
to reprehensibility whether conduct “involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident”).   
129.  Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82 (Cal. 2005). 
DOLE.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  2:38 PM 
2016] DAMAGE AND FEE AWARDS IN TRADE SECRET CASES 21 
 
The plaintiffs introduced evidence of identical or similar fraud in sales to 
others.  The jury awarded them $17,811 in compensatory damages and $10 
million in punitive damages.  An intermediate court of appeals reduced the 
punitive damages to $53,435, approximately three times the compensatory 
damages.130  The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the 
court of appeals “gave no express weight, in its assessment of the constitutional 
maximum, to the profitability of the scheme to Ford or the scale at which Ford 
pursued it.”131  Upon reconsideration, the court of appeals approved punitive 
damages of $175,000, which was just short of ten times the compensatory 
damages and just over the single-digit ratio that Campbell indicated ordinarily 
marked the limit of constitutionality.132 
Damage recoveries under the Uniform Act can be large.  The California 
federal district court decision in Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.133 is 
illustrative.  A jury found that Mattel willfully and maliciously had 
misappropriated twenty-six categories of the plaintiff’s trade secrets.  The 
evidence indicated that for years Mattel had encouraged employees to use false 
pretenses to access competitors’ private displays at international toy fairs and 
improperly to acquire competitive information.  Mattel praised employees that 
had engaged in this wrongdoing, had used the wrongfully acquired information, 
and had been unjustly enriched $85 million by the course of conduct.134  The 
jury awarded $88.5 million dollars in compensatory damages, which the trial 
court ordered remitted to $85 million dollars in order to avoid a new trial.135  
Acknowledging that Mattel’s conduct had been “silly, not evil,”136 under the 
Gore/Campbell Guideposts, the federal district court awarded $85 million in 
punitive damages and $2,172,000 in attorney’s fees.137  Because the 
compensatory damages were large and Mattel’s conduct had been “silly not 
evil,”138 the federal district court in substance followed the Campbell dictum in 
rejecting a request for punitive damages that were two times the compensatory 
recovery and awarding punitive damages equal to the compensatory 
recovery.139 
 
130.  Id. at 85.   
131.  Id. at 97.   
132.  Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 294–295 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). See 
supra note 101 for the Campbell discussion of the limits of constitutionality. 
133.  Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 950 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
134.  Id. at 954–955, 958. 
135.  Id. at 955. 
136.  Id. at 956.   
137.  Id. at 953–955, 958. 
138.  Id. at 956.  Mattel’s employees had used “cheap fake business cards, silly nicknames, and 
amateurish tactics” to gain access to competitors’ trade secrets.  Id. at 955. 
139.  Id. at 952, 956.  See supra note 102 (indicating that a substantial compensatory damage 
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Of course, there have been and there will be willful and malicious 
misappropriation cases involving greater reprehensiveness.  One example is a 
former employee who secretly submitted a patent application in his own name 
and deliberately deleted the only computer files describing the invention before 
surrendering his laptop and resigning.140 In another case, a former accountant 
and vice-president of the plaintiff had setup a competing business to 
manufacture cheese according to the plaintiff’s secret method, and, using the 
plaintiff’s business plan, intended to choke off the plaintiff’s supply of milk 
and to take over the plaintiff’s customers.141 
The Uniform Act provision giving a trial judge discretion to award a 
successful plaintiff reasonable attorney fees for willful and malicious 
misappropriation142 is not per se subject to the Gore/Campbell guideposts.  The 
premise of Gore/Campbell is that “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined 
in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not 
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity 
of the penalty that a State may impose.”143 
In contrast to purely punitive damages, a Uniform Act reasonable attorney’s 
fee award compensates a successful plaintiff for the attorney’s fees caused by 
willful and malicious misappropriation.144  Moreover, an award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees must be based upon objective evidence145 and approved by the 
 
recovery could require a 1:1 relationship between punitive and compensatory damages).  See also Jones 
v. United Postal Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1195, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 Sup. Ct. 
413 (2012) (jury found $630,307 in compensatory damages and $2 million dollars in punitive damages; 
under the Campbell dictum, punitive damages reduced to $630,307); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 
738 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1987).  In Boeing, a jury awarded Boeing $1,635,333 in actual damages.  The 
trial judge found the defendant’s conduct to be willful and malicious and awarded $1,635,333 in 
punitive damages and $353,565 in attorney’s fees. Id. at 672, 683–684.  The Washington Supreme 
Court affirmed these awards and remanded for the addition of Boeing’s appellate attorney’s fees.  Id. 
at 670. 
140.  B&B Microscopes v. Armogida, 532 F. Supp. 2d 744, 750–751, 753 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
141.  Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1040–1042, 1056 (Conn. 1999). 
142.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4(iii), 14 U.L.A. at 642. 
143.  BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (1973). 
144.  See Clearone Commc’ns, Inc. v. Biamp Sys., 653 F.3d 1163, 1185–1186 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(dictum) (a Uniform Act attorney’s fee award is compensatory in nature).  This is not to say that a 
Uniform Act attorney’s fee award should be included in compensatory damages in computing the ratio 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages under the Guideposts.  Mark A. Behrens, Cary 
Silverman & Christopher E. Appel, Calculating Punitive Damage Ratios with Extracompensatory 
Attorney Fees and Judgment Interest: A Violation of the United States Supreme Court’s Due Process 
Jurisprudence? 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV, 1295, 1326 (2013) (“[I]ncluding extracompensatory 
damages in the a [sic.] ratio calculation for punitive damages is contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
punitive damages jurisprudence and unsound as a matter of policy.”). 
145.  For this reason, Connecticut limits common-law punitive damages to a successful 
plaintiff’s expenses of litigation minus taxable costs.  Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 437 (Conn. 
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trial court. Reasonable attorney’s fees ordinarily can be awarded to a successful 
plaintiff based upon the defendant’s intentional or conscious-disregard course 
of profitable misappropriation. 
Nevertheless, lax judicial supervision could result in an award of attorney’s 
fees that is “grossly excessive” and “arbitrary.”146  In Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley,147 
for example, the plaintiff recovered a jury verdict for more than $2,770,000 in 
compensatory damages on multiple claims, including trade secret 
misappropriation.  The successful plaintiff moved for an award of $4,541,235 
in attorney’s fees for more than 15,000 hours of attorney time and 3,800 hours 
of paralegal time.  After close scrutiny, the trial judge reduced the fee request 
60%, awarding $1,816,494 in attorney’s fees.148  If the trial judge had approved 
the entire $4,541,235 fee request following minimal scrutiny, the award would 
have been “grossly excessive” and “arbitrary.” 
V.  OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING PUNITIVE DAMAGE AND ATTORNEY’S FEE 
AWARDS IN TRADE SECRET CASES 
Traditional common-law factors considered by fact finders in determining 
the amount of punitive damages include: (1) the reprehensiveness of the 
defendant’s misconduct; (2) the defendant’s wealth; (3) the profitability of the 
misconduct; (4) the successful plaintiff’s litigation costs; (5) the aggregate of 
all civil and criminal sanctions against the defendant; and (6) the ratio between 
the harm caused or potentially caused by the defendant’s misconduct and the 
losses suffered by the plaintiff.149  The characteristics of trade secret cases 
require fine-tuning of these factors. 
A.  The Defendant’s Inability-to-Pay Defense 
The traditional concern with the wealth of the defendant150 has special 
significance for punitive damages and attorney’s fee awards.  Defendants 
charged with trade secret misappropriation frequently include former 
employees of the plaintiff,151 who may not have deep pockets. 
The United States Supreme Court has minimized the significance of a 
 
1992) (“Common law punitive damages cannot exceed the plaintiff’s expenses of litigation, less his 
taxable costs.”). 
146.  See Gore, 517 U.S. 559; Campbell, 538 U.S. 408. See supra note 143.  
147.  Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley, 895 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D.S.C. 2012). 
148.  Id. at 708, 712–719. 
149.  3 DOBBS et al., supra note 6, at 44.  
150.  Id. 
151.  E.g., Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, CA No. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL 610725, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 18, 2010) (former employer sued three former employees and the company that they had 
established for breach of contract and trade secret misappropriation).   
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defendant corporation’s strong financial condition in evaluating the 
constitutional excessiveness of a punitive damage award.  The financial 
strength of the defendant is not a Gore guidepost.152  Indeed, Mr. Justice 
Stevens indicated that the defendant’s financial strength was irrelevant stating, 
“[t]he fact that BMW is a large corporation rather than an impecunious 
individual does not diminish its entitlement to fair notice of the demands that 
the several States impose on the conduct of its business.”153 
The Campbell majority decision reemphasized Mr. Justice Stevens’ 
comment, adding “[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise 
unconstitutional punitive damages award.”154  The United States Supreme 
Court, however, has never indicated that a defendant’s poor financial condition 
could not reduce the amount or the appropriateness of punitive damages.155 
Except in Colorado, Kentucky, and North Dakota,156 evidence of the 
defendant’s financial condition is admissible with respect to the amount of 
punitive damages.157  The California courts have discussed the significance of 
the defendant’s inability to pay most explicitly.  In the leading case, Adams v. 
Murakami,158 a majority of the California Supreme Court said, “[e]ven if an 
 
152.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–575. The initial defendants were the Birmingham BMW dealer 
with which Dr. Gore dealt, the American distributor of BMW automobiles, and the German 
manufacturer.  Id. at 563 n. 2.  The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the judgment against the 
German manufacturer due to insufficient minimum contacts with Alabama.  BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 622 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996). 
153.  BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996). 
154.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (1973). 
155.  See F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damage Awards, 60 
FLA. L. REV. 349, 387 (2008) (“To a considerable degree, the Court’s substantive framework is 
designed for large corporate defendants.”).  But see Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc., 136 
P.3d 428, 450–451 (Kan. 2006) (“Gore and Campbell teach that consideration of wealth is a merely 
peripheral consideration compared to the three guideposts, which attend more closely to a defendant’s 
conduct than to its status. It seems reasonable to extend the principle to what MCMC urges the court 
to view as lack of wealth, which also would be merely peripheral to the guideposts.”) (defendants were 
corporations, not individuals). 
156.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(6) (Lexis Nexis 2013) (evidence of the income or 
net worth of a party shall not be considered in a civil action for exemplary damages); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 32-03.2-11(3) (2010) (evidence of a defendant’s financial condition or net worth is not admissible 
with respect to exemplary damages); Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Smith, 142 S.W.3d 153, 167 (Ky. 
2004)(“[N]o evidence as to the financial condition of either defendant or plaintiff should be admitted 
in any case in which punitive damages might be recovered”). 
157.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, cmt. e. (“The wealth of the defendant also is 
relevant, since the purposes of exemplary damages are to punish for a past event and to prevent future 
offenses, and the degree of punishment or deterrence resulting from a judgment is to some extent in 
proportion to the means of the guilty person.”); Davis, supra note 110 at 1145 (a majority of the courts 
that have encountered the issue consider the wealth of the defendant relevant to the award of punitive 
damages). 
158.  Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991) (en banc). 
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award is entirely reasonable in light of the other two factors in Neal . . . (nature 
of the misconduct and amount of compensatory damages), the award can be so 
disproportionate to the defendant’s ability to pay that the award is excessive for 
that reason alone.”159 
The defendant’s financial condition at the time of trial ordinarily 
controls.160  The California Supreme Court majority also held that the burden 
is on the plaintiff seeking punitive damages to introduce evidence of the 
defendant’s financial condition,161 a position that has not been widely 
followed.162 
The Ninth Circuit has said that the California courts have limited punitive 
damage awards to approximately 10% or less of the defendant’s net worth.163  
However, Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc.,164 one of three 
California cases relied upon by the Ninth Circuit for this statement,165 examined 
sixteen prior decisions without finding “a single formula for calculating 
punitive damages,”166 and upheld a punitive damage award that was 17.5% of 
the corporate defendant’s net worth.167 
The Florida Supreme Court also requires consideration of the defendant’s 
 
159.  Id. at 1351. 
160.  Zhadan v. Downtown Los Angeles Motor Distrib., Inc., 161 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1979) (“Defendant finally contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of 
defendant’s net worth at the time of trial which was substantially greater that at the time of the first 
trial . . . . [T]he jury should make its determination of the punitive damages based on the defendant’s 
net worth at the time of trial.)  See also Rufo v. Simpson, 86 Cal. 4th 573, 620–621 (Cal. 2001) (a net 
worth statement can reflect the present value of the defendant’s future income).  But see Tarr v. Bob 
Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 943 A.2d 866, 872–873 (N.J. 2008) (corporate defendant’s claim that 
it was defunct did not preclude considering its financial condition both at the time of the wrongful 
conduct and subsequently). 
161.  Murakami, 813 P.2d at 1357–1360.  Accord, McDonough v. Jorda, 519 A.2d 874, 879 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (“Jorda offered no evidence on the ability of the wrongdoers to pay 
any award.  That lack of evidence, an essential of Jorda’s burden of proof, precluded the jury from 
having a proper foundation to assess [punitive] damages.”).  See also Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
959 P.2d 109, 112–113 (Utah 1998) (the plaintiff should introduce evidence of the defendant’s 
financial condition to justify an award of punitive damages exceeding three times the compensatory 
damages). 
162.  See, e.g., Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (“[W]e think the 
majority rule, which places no burden of production on the plaintiff, is sound, and we take this 
opportunity to make clear that it is indeed the law of this circuit.”). 
163.  Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. O’Connor, 32 F. App’x 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“As a general rule, punitive damage awards of approximately 10 percent of the defendant’s net worth 
and less have been upheld by the California courts, while awards exceeding that amount have been set 
aside as excessive.”). 
164.  Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
165.  Provident Life, 32 F. App’x at 826.  
166.  Devlin, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 208–209. 
167.  Id. at 211. 
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ability to pay punitive damages.  The Florida Supreme Court considers that the 
objective of punitive damages is the “punishment of each wrongdoer by 
exacting from his pocketbook a sum of money, which, according to his financial 
ability, will hurt, but not bankrupt.”168  The wisdom of this policy was 
demonstrated when three individuals maintained a Florida class action against 
the major tobacco companies and were awarded $145 billion in punitive 
damages.  This was approximately eighteen times the defendants’ combined 
net worth and would have put them all out of business!169  The Florida Supreme 
Court held that the punitive damages were excessive based upon the 
defendants’ ability to pay.170 
Maryland, like Florida, considers that punitive damages should not be 
disproportionate to the defendant’s ability to pay.171  A Maryland standard jury 
instruction states that punitive damages “must not bankrupt or financially 
destroy” the defendant.172 
The Florida and Maryland requirement that a punitive damage award 
should not bankrupt a defendant is not universally shared.  In Mattison v. Dallas 
Carrier Corp.,173 for example, a panel of the Fourth Circuit drafted jury 
instructions under South Carolina law that included the statement, “[a]ny 
penalty must be limited to punishment and thus may not affect economic 
bankruptcy.  To this end, the ability of the defendant to pay any punitive award 
entered should be considered.”174 
 
168.  Lehman v. Spencer Ladd’s Inc., 182 So. 2d 402, 404 (Fla. 1965). In 2004, the Florida 
Supreme Court authorized the use of a Standard Jury Instruction in civil cases involving punitive 
damages stating, “[Y]ou may not award an amount that would financially destroy (defendant).” 867 
So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam).  See also Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1186–1187 (Fla. 
1977) (ordering reinstatement of $800,000 punitive damage award constituting 6.2% of corporate 
defendant’s net worth).  A Tennessee intermediate appellate court cited the Florida Lehman case for 
the “general rule” that punitive damages must not bankrupt a defendant and ordered verdicts for 
punitive damages reduced.  Hardin v. Caldwell, 695 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).  
169.  Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 456–457 (Fla. App. 2003), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).  
170.  Engle, 945 So. 2d 1246, 1265 n.8 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (alternative holding).  Because 
the trial plan had allowed a lump sum determination of punitive damages for the entire class after 
compensatory damages had been determined for only three class representatives, the Florida Supreme 
Court alternatively held that a reviewing court could not meaningfully compare the relationship of the 
punitive damages to the compensatory damages.  Id. at 1265 (alternative holding). 
171.  Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 652 A.2d 1117, 1130 (Md. 1995) (“Upon request, a 
jury should be instructed that punitive damages should not be disproportionate to . . . the defendant’s 
ability to pay.”). 
172.  VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 686 A.2d 647, 659 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996), 
aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grounds, 715 A.2d 188 (Md. 1998) (this instruction is a “special 
prerequisite” to a punitive damage award). 
173.  Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991). 
174.  Id. at 110. 
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When a South Carolina defendant subsequently challenged the 
excessiveness of the punitive damages awarded by a South Carolina jury to 
which this instruction had been given, the South Carolina Court of Appeals 
declared the instruction to be unduly favorable to the defendant.175  The 
resulting bankruptcy of the defendant is not a bar to the imposition of punitive 
damages in South Carolina.176 
In trade secret cases, it would be desirable if every jurisdiction adopted the 
California, Florida, and Maryland approach that requires fact finders to 
consider evidence that an award of punitive damages would be excessive in 
light of the defendant’s ability to pay.  The defendant’s ability to pay likewise 
should affect the award of attorney’s fees.177  Even rigorously scrutinized 
requests for attorney’s fees can involve substantial amounts.  In Uhlig, LLC v. 
Shirley,178 for instance, the trial judge reduced the requested attorney’s fees by 
60%, but nevertheless awarded $1,816,494.179 Laughinghouse v. Risser180 
represents the situation in most jurisdictions, and, even in California, Florida, 
and Maryland, a defendant should request a jury instruction or a finding that 
ability to pay matters and introduce meaningful evidence of inability to pay.181 
In Laughinghouse, a former female employee of a consumer loan 
corporation sued her former supervisor and the corporation for outrageous 
conduct causing severe emotional distress.182  A jury awarded the former 
employee $100,000 in compensatory damages.  Ten thousand dollars in 
 
175.  Welch v. Epstein, 536 S.E.2d 408, 424–425 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000). 
176.  Id.  Although Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1983), states in dictum that “an award which bankrupts the defendant is excessive,” the Illinois 
Supreme Court has not endorsed this.  Deal v. Byford, 537 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1989) (“Contrary to 
the defendants’ assertion, the absence of any evidence regarding their financial status does not mean 
that the jury’s award [of punitive damages] must be set aside.  Evidence regarding the financial status 
of a defendant is simply one relevant consideration to be weighed by the judge or jury in determining 
an appropriate award of punitive damages.  The plaintiff was not required to present such evidence, 
and the defendants made no attempt to do so.  The defendants cannot now complain of its absence.”). 
177.  E.g., United Centrifugal Pumps v. Cusimano, No. B7-3074, 1988 WL 1091936, at *1, 
*16 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 1988) (trial court utilized its discretion to decline to award prevailing 
corporation its attorney’s fees from defendant former employees).  See also Chemetall Gmbh v. ZR 
Energy, Inc., No. 99 C 4334, 2002 WL 23826, at *1,*7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2002) (the jury awarded 
punitive damages against an individual, but the trial judge declined to impose liability for the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees in part because of the individual’s “limited ability . . . to bear the substantial attorneys’ 
fee and cost award that is sought. . . .”). 
178.  Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley, 895 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D.S.C. 2012). 
179.  Id. at 719. 
180.  Laughinghouse v. Risser, 786 F. Supp. 920 (D. Kan. 1992). 
181.  Affirmative action by a defendant is least necessary in California, which atypically 
requires a plaintiff to introduce evidence of the defendant’s financial condition.  See supra note 161.  
Affirmative action by the defendant nevertheless is the more prudent course in California as well. 
182.  Laughinghouse, 786 F. Supp. at 922.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 46 (discussing outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causing severe emotional distress). 
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punitive damages were assessed against her former supervisor and $600,000 in 
punitive damages were assessed against her former employer.183  The 
corporation asserted that the punitive damages awarded against it had been the 
product of unfair speculation as no evidence of its financial condition had been 
presented.  The trial court rejected this challenge, noting that the corporation 
had the burden of introducing evidence of its financial condition and requesting 
an instruction that the jury consider it, but had done neither.184  There also are 
other protective steps that each defendant from whom punitive damages or 
attorney’s fees are sought should be entitled to take.  Because the financial 
condition of multiple defendants will vary, each defendant should be able to 
ask for a special verdict or finding with respect to its liability for punitive 
damages and attorney’s fees.185 The liability also should be several, not joint 
and several,186 and not subject to a right to contribution of fellow 
misappropriators.187 
It seems likely that defendants, not infrequently, fail to assert a meritorious 
 
183.  Laughinghouse, 786 F. Supp. at 922.  
184.  Id. at 926–927 (alternative holding).  The trial court also noted that there had been 
testimony that the corporation had 1,130 offices as well as testimony on the types and size of loans 
made by the Topeka office).  Id.  Accord, Pluid v. B.K., 948 P.2d 981, 985–986 (Alaska 1997) (“A 
defendant which does not put on evidence of its financial worth cannot complain the jury did not have 
such evidence.”); Rinaldi v. Aaron, 314 So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1975) (“If defendant’s financial worth 
is meager, it would be to his advantage to introduce such evidence in order to mitigate the damage 
award.”); Deal v. Byford, 537 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1989) (“Contrary to the defendants’ assertion, the 
absence of any evidence regarding their financial status does not mean that the jury’s award [of punitive 
damages] must be set aside . . . . The plaintiff was not required to present such evidence and the 
defendants made no attempt to do so.  The defendants cannot now complain of its absence.”); Economy 
Roofing & Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641, 654 (Iowa 1995) (“The district court made it 
clear it was submitting the punitive damage issue to the jury . . . . Douglas knew he was vulnerable for 
an award of punitive damages.  Because he did not introduce evidence of his lack of resources to pay 
punitive damages, he cannot now complain because of the lack of such evidence.”). 
185.  Lehman v. Spencer Ladd’s Inc., 182 So. 2d 402, 403–404 (Fla. 1965) (“[A] special or 
separate verdict shall be used for the assessment of punitive damages against each tortfeasor . . . .’  
This procedure with the allowance of evidence of the financial worth of the tortfeasors, will make 
possible . . . punishment of each wrongdoer by exacting from his pocketbook a sum of money which, 
according to his financial ability, will hurt but not bankrupt.’”); Sanchez v. Clayton, 877 P.2d 567, 572 
(N.M. 1994) (“[P]unitive damages against two or more defendants must be separately determined.”). 
186.  E.g., Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 1011 (Kan. 1993) (“The imposition of joint and 
several liability for punitive damages is contrary to the purpose for which punitive damages are 
awarded . . . The amount of the award is to be calculated with the individual defendant’s financial 
status and conduct in mind.”); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) 
(“Because of the exemplary nature of punitive damages, defendants may not be held jointly and 
severally liable for such damages.”). 
187.   E.g., Hall v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 491 N.E.2d 879, 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) 
(“punitive damages are not subject to contribution”), rev’d on other grounds, 524 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. 
1988); Exxon Corp., 516 A.2d at 997 (“[T]he Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act does not 
apply to punitive damages.”).  
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inability-to-pay defense.  McFarland v. Brier188 is a case in which this was true.  
Defendant  Michael Brier had performed accounting services for the plaintiff 
corporation.  Brier had established a competing business with the assistance of 
a former president of the plaintiff corporation who was bound by a covenant 
not to compete.189 The corporate defendants were Brier’s accounting firm and 
the corporate competitor that Brier had formed.190  A trial judge sitting without 
a jury held that the accounting firm was not liable but that Brier and the 
competing corporation were jointly and severally liable for $67,936 in 
compensatory damages; Punitive damages were denied.191  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, erroneously holding192 that, in view of 
the clear willful and malicious misappropriation, it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court not to have awarded an additional two times compensatory 
damages in punitive damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees.193  The Rhode 
Island Court also ruled that the accounting corporation was jointly and severally 
liable, and that the individual plaintiff was entitled to recover for the loss in 
value of his stock in the corporate plaintiff.194  Upon remand, the trial judge 
imposed joint and several liability upon both corporations and Mr. Brier for 
$478,980 in compensatory damages, $302,760 in punitive damages,195 and 
$401,090 in attorney’s fees.196 
Rhode Island is a majority rule jurisdiction in which evidence of the 
defendant’s financial condition is admissible with respect to the amount of 
punitive damages and the defendant has the burden of introducing that 
evidence.197  But the defendants in McFarland had not made their financial 
condition an issue and had not introduced any evidence. Mr. Brier, who filed 
 
188.  McFarland v. Brier, 769 A.2d 605 (R.I. 2001). 
189.  Id. at 607–609. 
190.  Id. at 608-609.  
191.  McFarland v. Brier, No. 96-1007, 1998 WL 269223, at **10–12 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 13, 
1998).  The trial court also enjoined the accountant and the competing corporation from using or 
disclosing the plaintiff’s trade secrets.  Id. at *12–13. 
192.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court ignored the Uniform Act’s leaving the award of punitive 
damages and attorney’s fees to the discretion of a trial court sitting without a jury even if willful and 
malicious misappropriation existed.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
193.  McFarland, 769 A.2d at 611–613. 
194.  Id. at 610–611, 613–614.   
195.  The reason that the punitive damages were not two times the $478,980 is that the trial 
court read the Supreme Court opinion as requiring the doubling of only the $151,380 discussed by the 
Supreme Court as compensatory damages.  McFarland v. Brier, No. 96-1007, 2001 WL 1097779, at 
*6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2001). 
196.  Id.  
197.  General Providence Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 485 A.2d 1242, 1245 (R.I. 1984) (“Here, 
Quaranto was on notice that punitive damages were being sought, and he made no effort to introduce 
any evidence of his modest means.  Under these circumstances, we do not believe that he should now 
be heard to complain about their absence or paucity.”). 
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liquidation bankruptcy prior to the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision,198 
had failed to assert a meritorious inability-to-pay defense. 
B. Exclusion of the Defendant’s Profit From Misappropriation from 
Punitive Damages 
A traditional consideration in determining the amount of punitive damages 
is the profitability of the defendant’s wrongdoing.199  However, this factor 
should not be utilized under the Uniform Act, which allows recovery of 
damages for the “unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation.”200 
C. Either Inclusion or Exclusion of the Successful Plaintiff’s Reasonable 
Attorney’s Fees in Punitive Damages 
An Official Comment to Uniform Act § 4 states that a trial court should 
take into account the extent to which exemplary (punitive) damages are 
awarded in determining whether to award attorney’s fees.201  A prevailing 
plaintiff that has obtained or believes that he or she will obtain a finding of 
willful and malicious misappropriation ordinarily requests both punitive 
damages and attorney’s fees.202  Whether punitive damages will be awarded 
should be decided first.  In some jurisdictions, unless a constitutional right to a 
jury trial is waived, a jury will decide both whether willful and malicious 
misappropriation existed and the amount of punitive damages.203  In other 
jurisdictions, a trial judge will.  What is important is that the trial judge knows 
whether or not reimbursement of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees was included in 
a punitive damage award before ruling upon a motion for attorney’s fees.  If 
reimbursement was included, the motion for attorney’s fees is duplicative and 
should be denied. 
If a trial judge will decide whether both punitive damages and attorney’s 
 
198.  In re Brier, 274 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (Brier filed a Ch. 11 petition that was 
dismissed followed by a Ch. 7 petition on 1/30/01).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court decision was 
handed down in April, 2001. See supra note 188. 
199.  3 DOBBS et al., supra note 5, at 44 (the profitability of the misconduct is a factor). 
200.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. at 633–634. 
201.  Id.§ 4 cmt., 14 U.L.A. at 642. 
202.  Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, No. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL 610725 at *33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
18, 2010) (“Agilent also argues that it is entitled to punitive damages and attorney’s fees for the 
defendants’ willful and malicious misappropriation of Agilent’s trade secrets.”).  
203.  If evidence of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees is submitted to a jury, under the Uniform Act, 
the defendant should be entitled to present evidence both that the amount claimed is unreasonable and 
that the attorney’s fees were not incurred with respect to a claim for trade secret misappropriation.  Cf. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4(iii), 14 U.L.A. at 642.  In other litigation in which evidence of litigation 
cost is offered for reimbursement through punitive damages, the courts may or may not review the 
reasonableness of the claimed expenses.  See Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 436–437 (Conn. 1992) 
(a court can consider a contingent fee agreement in determining the amount of punitive damages). 
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fees will be awarded,204 Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Kirkland205 is of interest.  
In Agilent, a Delaware Vice Chancellor awarded the plaintiff lost profits with 
prejudgment interest, consistent unjust enrichment damages, a permanent 
injunction against use of its trade secrets, and a mandatory injunction requiring 
the defendants to return the plaintiff’s property relating to the trade secrets.  The 
defendants were also ordered to withdraw two pending patent applications and 
to refrain from filing  a new patent application based upon the misappropriated 
trade secrets.206  The Vice Chancellor found that the defendants’ 
misappropriation had been willful and malicious, and the plaintiff moved for 
both punitive damages and attorney’s fees.207  In order to more fully 
compensate the plaintiff, the Vice Chancellor awarded reasonable attorney’s 
fees but declined to impose punitive damages because the other remedies 
granted adequately vindicated the plaintiff’s interests.208  On the other hand, if 
a trial judge elected to grant both motions, the judge should exclude 
reimbursement of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees for misappropriation claims 
from the punitive damage award.209  But, if only the motion for punitive 
damages was granted, reimbursement of the plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s 
fees for misappropriation claims could be included in the punitive damages 
award.210 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Economic damage caused by repeated and profitable trade secret 
misappropriation that was either intentional or in conscious disregard of 
another’s trade secret rights involves sufficiently reprehensible conduct for 
punitive damages to be awarded.  However, if the compensatory damages 
recovered are substantial and the reprehensibility did not include subjective evil 
intent, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages should be nearer 
1:1 than to the two times the compensatory damages allowed by the Uniform 
 
204.  For example, as a result of waiver of the right to a jury trial. 
205.  Agilent Techs, No. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL 610725 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010). 
206.  Id. at **24–33. 
207.  Id. at *33. 
208.  Id. at *34.  
209.  E.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 672, 683–84 (Wash. 1987) (both 
punitive damages in the same amount as compensatory damages and attorney’s fees awarded); Great 
American Opportunities, Inc., LLC, CA No. 3718-VCP, 2010 WL 338219 at *27–29 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
20, 2010) (both punitive damages in the same amount as compensatory damages and attorney’s fees 
awarded). 
210.  See supra notes 202–203.  In including the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in the punitive 
damages award, the trial judge should excise unreasonable fees and fees unrelated to trade secret 
misappropriation just as she or he would have if the motion for award of attorney’s fees had been 
granted.  Cf. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT§ 4(iii), 14 U.L.A. at 642. 
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Act.  On the other hand, attorney’s fee awards to plaintiffs that are limited to 
reasonable fees for successful trade secret misappropriation claims are not 
subject to Gore/Campbell restrictions. 
All defendants, whether individuals, corporations, or partnerships, should 
take advantage of the opportunity afforded by most states to introduce evidence 
of inability to pay as a defense to liability for punitive damages.  Inability to 
pay also should be a defense to liability for attorney’s fees. 
The trial judge should defer acting upon a motion to award attorney’s fees 
to a successful plaintiff until the trier of fact determines whether any punitive 
damages awarded will include reimbursement of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees 
for misappropriation claims.  Whenever punitive damages reimburse the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees for misappropriation claims, a motion to award 
attorney’s fees should be denied.  Furthermore, unjust enrichment damages are 
recoverable under the Uniform Act.  Punitive damages should not include the 
defendant’s profit from misappropriation. 
 
 
 
